Mentioned via I was very unsure
about whether this book would be worth reading as it could easily have been focused on whether this book would be worth reading as it could easily have been focused on about behavior that experts have long nown are mistakenI was pleasantly surprised when it uickly got to some of the really hard uestions and was thoughtful about what uestions deserved attention I disagree with enough of Sullivan s premises that I have significant disagreements with her conclusions Yet her reasoning is usually good enough that I m unsure what to make of our disagreements they re typically due to differences make of our disagreements they re typically due to differences intuition that she admits are controversialI had hoped for some discussion of ethics eg what discount rate to use in evaluating climate change whereas the book focuses purely on prudential rationality ie what s rational for a self interested person Still the discussion of prudential rationality covers most of the issues that make the ethical choices hardPersonal identityA ey issue is the nature of personal identity does one s identity change over timeSullivan starts this discussion by comparing
single agent model to a model with multiple distinct stagesI found that part of the book confusing as neither model seems close to mine and she seemed to present them as the only possible models Then somewhat later on in the book I figured out that both those models assumed that identity needed to stay constant for some time and that in the case of. Should you care less about your distant future What about events in your life that have already happened How should the passage of time affect your planning and assessment of your life Most of us think it is irrational to ignore the future but completely harmless to dismiss the past But this book argues that rationality reuires temporal neutrality if you are.
a single agent model to a model with multiple distinct stagesI
Meghan Sullivan ´ 7 reviewThe multiple stage model the change in identity was discontinuousSullivan prefers that ind of single agent model and therefore concludes that we kind of single agent model and therefore concludes that we adopt a time neutral stance ie she rejects any time discounting and expects us to care as much about our distant future selves as we care about our present selvesSullivan eventually compares that single agent model to some models in which a current self partially identifies with a future self which would allow for time discounting of how much we care about a selfThe most interesting of those models involves some notion of connectedness between current and future selvesThis
feels like the obviously right approach to me I expect itlike the obviously right approach to me I expect it work something like the me of a decade ago or a decade in the future being something I consider to be maybe 75% me Ie I practice time discounting but with a low enough discount rate that it might be hard to distinguish from no discounting in many contextsSullivan looks at some possible measures of connectedness and convinces me that they don t explain normal attitudes toward our future selvesI suggest that she s too uick to give up on her search for connectedness measures I think the things which cause me to care about my future self resemble what causes me to feel connected to friends so it should include something like the extent to which we expect to interact That includes some measures of how much my present self interac. Rational you don't engage in any ind of temporal discounting The book draws on puzzles about real life planning to build the case for temporal neutrality How much should you save for retirement Does it make sense to cryogenically freeze your brain after death How much should you ask to be compensated for a past injury Will climate change make your life meani.